Mediohombre: Part 3 - Cartagena

Part 1
Part 2
 
Alright, let's bring this home. At this juncture, I assume we've all done our required reading. Part 1 of this mini-series details the building of the legacy that is Don Blas de Lezo, the outstanding naval man of 18th century Spain. Part 2 is kind of a condensed course on the War of Jenkins' Ear - deteriorating international relations between Britain and Spain, culminating with a series of raids on Spanish colonies by Vice Admiral Edward Vernon, leading us to his eventual assault on Cartagena.

Finally, our tales converge -- those of Admiral Blas de Lezo and aggressive British imperialist ambition in the Caribbean. On 4 March, 1741, an intimidating fleet sailed into the waters off of Cartagena under the command of Vernon and troop commander Thomas Wentworth. This fleet consisted of 29 ships of the line, 22 frigates, 135 troop transports, 15 400 sailors, and 12 000 marines and militiamen.

I haven't spoken with the man, but Vernon was surely confident of his mission. With six ships he had captured one of Spain's key cities, and he now stood on a flagship in command of over 27 000 men. Given his royal treatment in the preceding winter, he may have fancied himself a conqueror, or envisioned a place among the Pantheon of British admiralty. Howard - Blake - Vernon. In the study of history we often observe moments and wonder what people may have felt. I can only imagine the supreme self-assurance that must have been flitting across his mind as he floated in those Colombian waters that spring day.

He was not wrong to be content. Ready to repel him was Blas de Lezo, supposed to be on a relaxed retirement detail, and some 4000 military personnel, only 3000 of them actual marines and regulars. He also boasted a whopping naval component of 6 ships, and assorted gun batteries.

De Lezo was severely outgunned and outmanned, but he was as prepared as a retired middle-aged man could hope to be. Even so, Don Blas knew he could not defeat such a force with muscle or tactic, so he turned to his greatest ally. More than flesh or steel, de Lezo would use the Colombian environment. His plan was to delay the advance of the British as long as possible, until the onset of the Colombian rainy season, when further military action would be impossible. His plan, as they often did, worked brilliantly.

The only way for the British fleet to get to the Cartagenan harbor, and near to the town, or the nearby Fort San Lazaro, was through the Boca Chica Channel. Therefore, the British naval attack worked its way up this channel, facing fire from the various forts around the town, as well as de Lezo's six ships. Considering the odds, the six Spanish ships held their own quite well. De Lezo, at one point, captured two British ships and scuttled them in the channel in order to further delay Vernon's progress. At the same time, the British had to try and take each fort they came across, taking the time to soften or breach the fort with ships' guns, or, even moretime-consuming, constructing gun batteries on land. These forts were defended fiercely, and de Lezo's ships made excellent account of themselves, and not unlike the Persians at Thermopylae, the British had to fight tooth and nail for every inch of the channel.

Even so, the odds were insurmountable for the Spanish defenders, and on 16 April, more than a month after arriving at Cartagena, Vernon cleared the harbor beaches with gunshot and the British troop commander, Thomas Wentworth, put boots on the sand, a ready target already in mind. The taking of San Lazaro was crucial, as it looked down upon the city. When in Spanish hands it made assault on Cartagena nearly impossible; and if the British took it, they could bombard the city and force a prompt surrender, which at this point, fighting relentless Spaniards and every disease imaginable for the past month, must have sounded fantastic to the British attackers. Knowing this, de Lezo dug in around San Lazaro, constructing a trench and clearing firing lines around the fort.

At this point I would like to address a key difference between de Lezo and Vernon - the relationship each man had with his partner in battle. De Lezo had to work with Sebastian de Eslava, Viceroy of New Granada (modern-day Colombia). In the previous year, de Lezo had worked hard to upgrade Cartagena's defenses, and his work ethic purportedly ruined his relationship with the Viceroy, who was, technically, in charge.Don Blas, however, did not let this stop him from making the necessary improvements to the defenses and preparing for just such an attack as the pair were now facing.

Conversely, Vernon was in business with Wentworth, and their sour relationship was one of the key factors in Britain's failure. The assault on San Lazaro in April was Vernon's idea, and according to historians, Wentworth, in charge of land operations, wholly opposed him and did not cooperate or communicate as well as he should have.

Before dawn on 20 April, 1741, approximately 2000 men assaulted fort San Lazaro from various directions, the fort's guns useless in the dark. Defending the fort were 650 men stationed in the aforementioned trenches, de Lezo among them. The image of musket smoke in the softening night, and a one-legged man pacing back and forth, ducking under fire and attempting to rally what should have been a futile defense, is fantastic.

The attack was slow in starting, hampered from the beginning by poor communication, and shortly after the battle begun, the sun came up and the fort began bombarding the British troops, forcing the ladder-carriers to run for cover. At 8:00, Spanish troops charged from the city and threatened to attack the British force from the rear, forcing Wentworth to sound the retreat.

The battle was quick and dirty, and may only have proved a minor setback in a larger campaign, but Don Blas had achieved his objective. It was the end of April, and the town still stood. The rainy season had come. On 25 April, Wentworth fell back to Jamaica, and was gone by the end of May. Interestingly, on 17 May, Britain was prepared to celebrate another grand victory from Vernon, 'Scourge of Spain.' Special medals were minted but never circulated. Like a Roman general hunting a triumph, Vernon could see his legend dimming by the hour. After the fiasco at Cartagena, Britain's pride was wounded and Vernon was left scrambling to recollect his reputation.

After a brief stay in Jamaica, Vernon steered his attack now toward Cuba, but this venture would prove quite futile. Landing at Guantanamo Bay in early August, Wentworth and his 3000 troops had stalled due to disease and fatigue. They would camp for four months, attempting to regain their footing, but after more than two-thirds of his force was stricken with fever, and having suffered hundreds of casualties to Cuban guerrillas, the fleet departed for England.

Vernon's failure in Cuba can be largely attributed to de Lezo's success at Cartagena. After two months in Colombia, the assault force was nearly decimated, either by fighting or disease. Vernon arrived at Cartagena in March with 12 000 soldiers and 51 ships. He sailed into Guantanamo Bay five months later with 3000 British troops and 21 ships.

Not only was the force a fraction of its original size, but those that remained were hardly in fighting condition. Within days of landing in Cuba, they were too sick or spent to continue the 45-mile march to Havana, and their confidence was undoubtedly shaken from the awful conditions, hard fighting, and sound defeat at the hands of Blas de Lezo.

The Spanish admiral would not get the opportunity to revel in his success, however. While fighting at San Lazaro, he was shot in his one good arm and died of infection the following September, his ability to trade body parts for military victories culminating in an epic achievement at Cartagena. He managed to use his surroundings as effectively as any field general, and displayed the steadfast mindset necessary to hold out in a near-hopeless situation, checking the British assault at its beginning and potentially saving large portions of Hispanic America for Spain. The impact of Don Blas' victory is larger than a Colombian city, and extends beyond a nine-year war of vanity.



"If I had been in Puerto Belo you would not have assaulted the fortresses of my master the King with impunity, because I would have supplied the valour the defenders of the Puerto Belo lacked, and checked their cowardice."

     - Blas de Lezo in a letter to Vice Admiral Vernon, on hearing  of the assault on Portobello

Mediohombre: Part 1 - The Life of Don Blas de Lezo

The 18th and 19th centuries were some of the most exciting times in the history of history. The world was one giant opportunity for swashbuckling adventure, and many men (and women) took advantage of it. This was a breeding ground for unquestionable badasses, but this time period was also notable for the developing power struggle between the Western European nation-states that vied for power over the rest of the world.

Today I would like to examine two of these things at once: the power struggle in a certain part of the world, and one of the greatest seafaring men ever produced. Vastly underrated and ignored in the English-speaking world, this man was not just an epic seaman and warrior, but a tough son of a bitch who managed to have a lasting effect on the way the map is drawn today. This is the story of Don Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta.

Blas de Lezo was born in 1689 in the shipbuilding port town of Pasajes in northern Spain. This sights and sounds of his hometown likely influenced his future, and fed a young affinity for the sea. Basque historian Conde de Llobregat wrote that "This background and the fantastic tales that he must have heard from the lips of the ships' captains, most certainly friends of his father and grandfather, like them gentlemen of the sea, influenced not a little the direction of the character of Don Blas, who soon began to show his [sea] leanings."

The young man was fueled not only by his surroundings: his aforementioned father and grandfather were men of the sea, his father a captain descended from a line of nobles and sailors. His Basque heritage is not to be ignored either. The people of the Steppe are known for their relationship with the horse, but northern Spain produced some of the greatest sailing men that ever lived. The Basques had documented whaling expeditions a 1300 years ago, and were some of the earliest cod-fishers off the coast of Newfoundland in the 15th and 16th centuries. The Basques were credited with the invention of the European rudder, and were the first people to circumnavigate the globe, as part of Magellan's expedition from 1519-1522. Blas de Lezo had sailing in his blood.

Don Blas was schooled in France as a child, then joined the Spanish Navy when he came of age. Of course, 'of age' meant 13 years old (some sources say 15, but he supposedly joined in 1702. I'm a historian, not a math whiz, but I think I can handle this one). In any case, Blas de Lezo joined up and was immediately baptized in fire in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Serving as a midshipman, de Lezo wasted no time earning a reputation as a skilled an valiant seaman. Early in his career, serving aboard the flagship of fleet commander Conde de Tolosa, de Lezo lost his leg fighting a squadron of Dutch warships near Malaga. According to legend, de Lezo neither received anesthetic nor made a soudn during the amputation, and his toughness combined with his aptitude and valor under fire earned him a recommendation from de Tolosa directly to King Phillip, which resulted in de Lezo promotion to sub-lieutenant. As mentioned, the dates are a bit hazy, but we do know that these things happened before the man had turned 16.

In 1706 de Lezo was pulled into French waters He lost an eye defending the fort of Sainte Catherine at the French port of Toulon in 1707, and was promoted to lieutenant in 1708. In 1710 he was granted his own frigate, and his defeat of the heavily-armed East India privateer Stanhope was a much-celebrated (and then-unheard-of) victory. Stanhope, besides being one of the funniest comedians working today, was one of just eleven ships de Lezo captured between 1710 and the end of the war four years later.

In a startling display of ability, de Lezo outmaneuvered the much more powerful Stanhope. Here is Cortellini's rendition of his frigate, 'crossing the T' and firing broadside into the larger ship's stern.

The great man finally lost a third part of his anatomy when his right arm was mangled by grapeshot while leading a successful amphibious assault on the long-besieged Barcelona, an attack that broke the back of
the Hapsburgs and essentially closed the war. Don Blas had entered the war a boy and left it a legend, still just 25 years old. Immediately after the war, his reward for outstanding service was the high honor of escorting newly-undisputed King Phillip's new bride, Elisabeth of Parma, to Spain.

Two years after the war, in 1716, de Lezo was given command of his first ship of the line, the 60-gun Lanfranco, and promoted the the rank of captain. Our hero then spent the next 14 years running missions for Hispanic Maerica, first as a convoy guard, then opposing pirate activities in the West Indies (modern Caribbean). In 1725 he married a Peruvian woman, Josepha Pacheco of Arica, and their first child, named for his father, was baptized early in 1726. De Lezo would remain active on the seas, despite his new family: when war broke out between Britain and Spain in 1727, within the first year de Lezo had captured six British and Dutch armed merchant ships, two of which he added to his own fleet, and took three million pesos's worth of loot.

The Anglo-Spanish war wound to a close in 1729, and the following year de Lezo requested that he be moved out of the Caribbean and closer to home. Once in Spain, he was granted his first leave in nearly thirty years of fighting, and King Phillip, who had always coveted Don Blas, personally promoted him to the rank of commodore.

De Lezo's leave would prove to be short-lived, as a special job called him back to action. In 1731 he was given command of the Mediterranean squadron and instructed to play the role of collector. Don Blas was dispatched to   Genoa to extract a sum of two million pesos owed to Spain, a debt long overdue. In December he arrived at Genoa with six ships, demanded the money in full, and, feeling that Spain had been insulted, called for a city-wide salute to the Spanish flag. When the leaders of Genoa balked at this request, de Lezo motioned toward his timepiece and said that they had mere hours to comply, and if they failed, he would 'raze the city, reducing it ashes.' The Genoans opted not to call him on this threat, producing the money immediately. Unfortunately, de Lezo sailed off after receiving the payment, and whether or not the salute happened has been lost to history.

De Lezo spent the rest of the 1730s doing what any good Christian would, fighting the Ottoman Corsairs. One of the highlights was his part in the massive assault on Oran in 1732, retaking the city for the Spanish. He played a pivotal role as fleet commander in the amphibious assault that included 30 000 Spanish troops and almost 600 ships. Though the city was retaken into Spanish custody, Bey Hussan (who had taken it for the Ottomans in 1708) managed to escape the city and return to besiege to Spanish garrison. De Lezo and his fleet drove off the assault, and, more than that, pursued the Algerian flagship, hit its powder stores and blew it up. JD Harbron suggests that de Lezo's experience at Oran would prove invaluable later in his career (hint, hint).

De Lezo spent the remainder of the decade battling pirates in the Mediterranean, then retired to Cartagena in 1740. The post was largely a cushy reward for 39 years of distinguished service, a high-paying, low-profile job "guarding" the city and nearby Fort San Lazaro. One would think that after a career of daring successes on the open seas, Don Blas would find his immortal moment at some point during his illustrious career, but it was during his retirement at Cartagena that de Lezo's name would pass into legend. It is also de Lezo's actions in Colombia that make him a relevant historical figure, and not just a fierce bane of pirates and Brits. In Cartagena, Blas de Lezo would change the course of history.

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This concludes Part 1 of the three-part series on Don Blas and his impact on the Mediterranean. Part 2 should be out shortly, so tune in. Thanks for reading.