Mediohombre: Part 3 - Cartagena

Part 1
Part 2
 
Alright, let's bring this home. At this juncture, I assume we've all done our required reading. Part 1 of this mini-series details the building of the legacy that is Don Blas de Lezo, the outstanding naval man of 18th century Spain. Part 2 is kind of a condensed course on the War of Jenkins' Ear - deteriorating international relations between Britain and Spain, culminating with a series of raids on Spanish colonies by Vice Admiral Edward Vernon, leading us to his eventual assault on Cartagena.

Finally, our tales converge -- those of Admiral Blas de Lezo and aggressive British imperialist ambition in the Caribbean. On 4 March, 1741, an intimidating fleet sailed into the waters off of Cartagena under the command of Vernon and troop commander Thomas Wentworth. This fleet consisted of 29 ships of the line, 22 frigates, 135 troop transports, 15 400 sailors, and 12 000 marines and militiamen.

I haven't spoken with the man, but Vernon was surely confident of his mission. With six ships he had captured one of Spain's key cities, and he now stood on a flagship in command of over 27 000 men. Given his royal treatment in the preceding winter, he may have fancied himself a conqueror, or envisioned a place among the Pantheon of British admiralty. Howard - Blake - Vernon. In the study of history we often observe moments and wonder what people may have felt. I can only imagine the supreme self-assurance that must have been flitting across his mind as he floated in those Colombian waters that spring day.

He was not wrong to be content. Ready to repel him was Blas de Lezo, supposed to be on a relaxed retirement detail, and some 4000 military personnel, only 3000 of them actual marines and regulars. He also boasted a whopping naval component of 6 ships, and assorted gun batteries.

De Lezo was severely outgunned and outmanned, but he was as prepared as a retired middle-aged man could hope to be. Even so, Don Blas knew he could not defeat such a force with muscle or tactic, so he turned to his greatest ally. More than flesh or steel, de Lezo would use the Colombian environment. His plan was to delay the advance of the British as long as possible, until the onset of the Colombian rainy season, when further military action would be impossible. His plan, as they often did, worked brilliantly.

The only way for the British fleet to get to the Cartagenan harbor, and near to the town, or the nearby Fort San Lazaro, was through the Boca Chica Channel. Therefore, the British naval attack worked its way up this channel, facing fire from the various forts around the town, as well as de Lezo's six ships. Considering the odds, the six Spanish ships held their own quite well. De Lezo, at one point, captured two British ships and scuttled them in the channel in order to further delay Vernon's progress. At the same time, the British had to try and take each fort they came across, taking the time to soften or breach the fort with ships' guns, or, even moretime-consuming, constructing gun batteries on land. These forts were defended fiercely, and de Lezo's ships made excellent account of themselves, and not unlike the Persians at Thermopylae, the British had to fight tooth and nail for every inch of the channel.

Even so, the odds were insurmountable for the Spanish defenders, and on 16 April, more than a month after arriving at Cartagena, Vernon cleared the harbor beaches with gunshot and the British troop commander, Thomas Wentworth, put boots on the sand, a ready target already in mind. The taking of San Lazaro was crucial, as it looked down upon the city. When in Spanish hands it made assault on Cartagena nearly impossible; and if the British took it, they could bombard the city and force a prompt surrender, which at this point, fighting relentless Spaniards and every disease imaginable for the past month, must have sounded fantastic to the British attackers. Knowing this, de Lezo dug in around San Lazaro, constructing a trench and clearing firing lines around the fort.

At this point I would like to address a key difference between de Lezo and Vernon - the relationship each man had with his partner in battle. De Lezo had to work with Sebastian de Eslava, Viceroy of New Granada (modern-day Colombia). In the previous year, de Lezo had worked hard to upgrade Cartagena's defenses, and his work ethic purportedly ruined his relationship with the Viceroy, who was, technically, in charge.Don Blas, however, did not let this stop him from making the necessary improvements to the defenses and preparing for just such an attack as the pair were now facing.

Conversely, Vernon was in business with Wentworth, and their sour relationship was one of the key factors in Britain's failure. The assault on San Lazaro in April was Vernon's idea, and according to historians, Wentworth, in charge of land operations, wholly opposed him and did not cooperate or communicate as well as he should have.

Before dawn on 20 April, 1741, approximately 2000 men assaulted fort San Lazaro from various directions, the fort's guns useless in the dark. Defending the fort were 650 men stationed in the aforementioned trenches, de Lezo among them. The image of musket smoke in the softening night, and a one-legged man pacing back and forth, ducking under fire and attempting to rally what should have been a futile defense, is fantastic.

The attack was slow in starting, hampered from the beginning by poor communication, and shortly after the battle begun, the sun came up and the fort began bombarding the British troops, forcing the ladder-carriers to run for cover. At 8:00, Spanish troops charged from the city and threatened to attack the British force from the rear, forcing Wentworth to sound the retreat.

The battle was quick and dirty, and may only have proved a minor setback in a larger campaign, but Don Blas had achieved his objective. It was the end of April, and the town still stood. The rainy season had come. On 25 April, Wentworth fell back to Jamaica, and was gone by the end of May. Interestingly, on 17 May, Britain was prepared to celebrate another grand victory from Vernon, 'Scourge of Spain.' Special medals were minted but never circulated. Like a Roman general hunting a triumph, Vernon could see his legend dimming by the hour. After the fiasco at Cartagena, Britain's pride was wounded and Vernon was left scrambling to recollect his reputation.

After a brief stay in Jamaica, Vernon steered his attack now toward Cuba, but this venture would prove quite futile. Landing at Guantanamo Bay in early August, Wentworth and his 3000 troops had stalled due to disease and fatigue. They would camp for four months, attempting to regain their footing, but after more than two-thirds of his force was stricken with fever, and having suffered hundreds of casualties to Cuban guerrillas, the fleet departed for England.

Vernon's failure in Cuba can be largely attributed to de Lezo's success at Cartagena. After two months in Colombia, the assault force was nearly decimated, either by fighting or disease. Vernon arrived at Cartagena in March with 12 000 soldiers and 51 ships. He sailed into Guantanamo Bay five months later with 3000 British troops and 21 ships.

Not only was the force a fraction of its original size, but those that remained were hardly in fighting condition. Within days of landing in Cuba, they were too sick or spent to continue the 45-mile march to Havana, and their confidence was undoubtedly shaken from the awful conditions, hard fighting, and sound defeat at the hands of Blas de Lezo.

The Spanish admiral would not get the opportunity to revel in his success, however. While fighting at San Lazaro, he was shot in his one good arm and died of infection the following September, his ability to trade body parts for military victories culminating in an epic achievement at Cartagena. He managed to use his surroundings as effectively as any field general, and displayed the steadfast mindset necessary to hold out in a near-hopeless situation, checking the British assault at its beginning and potentially saving large portions of Hispanic America for Spain. The impact of Don Blas' victory is larger than a Colombian city, and extends beyond a nine-year war of vanity.



"If I had been in Puerto Belo you would not have assaulted the fortresses of my master the King with impunity, because I would have supplied the valour the defenders of the Puerto Belo lacked, and checked their cowardice."

     - Blas de Lezo in a letter to Vice Admiral Vernon, on hearing  of the assault on Portobello